e Multiplicative Weights Update method (MWU) is a simple yet powerful algorithm for learning linear classi ers, for ensemble learningà la boosting, for approximately solving linear and semide nite systems, for computing approximate solutions to multicommodity ow problems, and for online convex optimization, among other applications.
INTRODUCTION
e Multiplicative Weights Update method (MWU, [1, 6] ) solves the general problem of "combining expert advice", in which an agent repeatedly chooses which action, or "expert", to play against an adaptive environment. e agent, a er playing an action, learns from the environment both the cost of that action and of other actions it could have played in that round. e environment, in turn, may adapt in order to minimize environment costs. MWU works by maintaining a weighted distribution over the action space, in which each action initially has equal weight, and by updating weights with a linear or exponential loss function to penalize poorly performing actions.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). is simple algorithm performs remarkably well: In number of rounds logarithmic in the size of the action space, MWU's expected cost approaches to within a small bound ϵ that of the best xed action the agent could have chosen in hindsight (MWU has bounded external regret). In [1] , Arora, Hazan, and Kale showed that MWU has wide-ranging connections to numerous problems in computer science, including optimization, linear and semide nite programming, and machine learning (cf. boosting [4] ).
Our work targets another important application of MWU that is perhaps of greater interest to the PODC community: the approximate solution of multi-agent games, especially as such games relate to the construction of distributed systems. It is well known (cf. [7, Chapter 4] ) that no-regret algorithms converge, in expectation when played by multiple independent agents, to a large equilibrium class known as Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCEs). CCEs may not be socially optimal, but for some games (e.g., Roughgarden's smooth games [8] ) the social, or objective, cost of such equilibrium states can be bounded with respect to the optimal cost (the Price of Anarchy, or POA, of the game). Our broader research program, the C project:
h ps://github.com/gstew5/cage seeks to use such results and others from algorithmic game theory and distributed optimization to build distributed systems -e.g., distributed network routers and load balancers -that have veri ed convergence and correctness properties by design.
Contributions. In promotion of the rst part of our broader research program, this brief announcement reports on the design, construction, and veri cation of the rst formally certi ed implementation of the MWU algorithm, available open-source on the C project's website. By veri ed, we mean our MWU implementation has mechanically checked convergence bounds and correctness proof within an interactive theorem prover (speci cally, Ssre ect [5] , an extension of the Coq [2] system). By convergence and correctness, we mean that we prove both that MWU produces the right answer (functional correctness wrt. a high-level functional speci cation), but also that it does so with external regret bounded by a function of the number of iterations of the protocol (convergence).
As we've mentioned, MWU has broad application across a number of subdisciplines of computer science, including linear programming, optimization, and machine learning. Our work uses MWU to implement no-regret dynamics, a general strategy for computing the CCEs of multi-agent games. By formally proving correctness and convergence results for our implementation of MWU, we demonstrate a new architecture for formal veri cation of (a subclass of) distributed systems: represent the system as a game, prove POA bounds for the game, then compose the POA results
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High---Level Functional Specification with our general proof of correctness and convergence of MWUwhich drives any such game to an approximate CCE, or ϵ-CCEto yield correctness and performance results of the overall system. Section 3 sketches how these pieces t together when applied to problem of distributed routing with a ne latency functions.
MWU IMPLEMENTATION AND PROOF
Our implementation and proof of MWU ( Figure 1 ) were designed to be extensible. At a high level, the structure of the proof follows the program re nement methodology, in which a high-level mathematical but ine cient speci cation of the MWU algorithm (High-Level Functional Speci cation) is gradually made more e cient by a series of re nements to various features of the program (for example, by replacing an ine cient implementation of a key-value map with a more e cient balanced binary tree). For each such re nement, we prove that every behavior of the lower-level program is one of the acceptable behaviors of the higherlevel program it re nes. us speci cations proved for all behaviors of the high-level program also apply to each behavior at the low level. By behavior here, we mean the trace of action distributions output by MWU as it interacts with, and receives cost vectors from, the environment.
In order to make our MWU implementation and proof extensible, we factor the lower implementation layers (Medium and Low) into an interpreter and semantics over a domain-speci c language specialized to MWU-style algorithms. e DSL de nes commands for updating the weights table as well as commands for interacting with the environment, in the style of process calculi or message-passing concurrency.
At the top level, the convergence theorem we prove of our highlevel functional MWU is:
Theorem perstep weights boundedregret : (expCostsR − OPTR)/T ≤ etaR + (ln size A) / (etaR * T).
Here expCostsR is the expected cost of MWU on a sequence of cost vectors, OPTR is the cumulative cost of the best xed action, etaR is the algorithm's exploration parameter η (required to lie in the range (0, 1/2]), ln size A is the natural log of the size of the action space A, and T is the number of time steps. 
, and can therefore be tuned to balance exploration of the state space versus exploitation of cost information learned from the environment. Since our MWU interpreter performs exact rational arithmetic (in fact, dyadic rational arithmetic for performance), we require that η be representable as a dyadic rational number.
As a second consequence of our use of exact arithmetic, our veri ed MWU uses the linear scaling term 1 − η · c (a) to update the weight of action a in each round, where c (a) denotes the cost of a in the previous round. A variant of the algorithm uses the exponential scaling term exp(−η · c (a)), which we cannot represent exactly in our executable version of MWU. One could use the Taylorseries approximation of e x to approximate exp(−η · c (a)) at each update step, but only at the expense of additional reasoning about approximation error bounds in the rest of the proof.
APPLICATIONS
No-regret algorithms such as MWU can be used to drive multiagent systems toward the ϵ-CCEs of arbitrary games. Although the CCEs of general games may have high social cost, those of smooth games, as identi ed by Roughgarden [8] , have robust Price of Anarchy (POA) bounds that extend even to ϵ-CCEs.
Our generic algorithm for proving bounds on the social cost of games like multi-agent a ne routing has the following steps:
(1) Prove that the game is (λ, µ)-smooth, for smoothness parameters λ and µ. e smoothness parameters are speci c to the game. In a ne routing, λ = 5 3 while µ = 1 3 . (2) Use smoothness from (1) to prove robust POA bounds for the game. For example, the POA of an ϵ-CCE of a (λ, µ)-smooth game is (2) and (3) to prove overall bounds on the social cost of the resulting state.
We illustrate with an application -distributed routing -in which we let multiple agents independently run our veri ed MWU to drive each other toward an ϵ-CCE. 1 In a simple version of the distributed routing game with a ne latency functions (Figure 2) , N routing agents each choose a path from a global source vertex s to a global sink vertex t (a generalization of this game allows s and t to di er across players). Latency over edge e, modeled by an a ne cost function f e (x ) = a e x +b e , scales in the amount of tra c x over that edge. An optimal solution minimizes the total cost to all agents. Roughgarden [8] showed that such games are ( 5 3 , 1 3 )-smooth, implying a robust POA bound of 5/2; thus even ϵ-CCEs as produced by MWU are bounded with respect to the socially optimal solutions of the game.
In Coq, we represent games as pairs (A,C) of • a nite type A, the strategy or action space; and • a cost function C (i,s) : Q, which for a given player i ∈ [0, N ) returns the cost to that player of state s, a strategy pro le of type [0, N ) → A mapping players to strategies. As an example game, consider a simpli ed version of resource (congestion) games [3] in which agents may choose to use (or not use) just a single resource. 2 e cost to a player of this game is the total number of players using the resource, assuming the player chooses to use the resource, and 0 otherwise.
In Coq, we represent this game's strategy space A as the inductive data type Resource RYes | RNo in which the constructor RYes indicates that the agent chose to use the resource and RNo otherwise. 3 
e cost function for Resource is:
C Resource (i,s) = if s i is RYes then tra ic s else 0 where tra ic s equals the total number of agents who used the resource in state s.
From basic games such as (Resource, C Resource ) we build more complicated ones using a language of game combinators (functions mapping games to games). For example, the product combinator over games -which can be thought of informally as running two games in parallel -takes as input games (A,C A ) and (B,C B ) and produces as output the new game (A × B,C A×B ) over states mapping players to ordered pairs (a,b). e cost function C A×B of the resulting game sums the costs with respect to C A and C B . To prove smoothness of both basic games such as (Resource, C Resource ) and of derived games, we developed a library of smoothness preservation proofs following the structure of our language of game combinators. In the product game, for example, if , µ B ) )-smooth. We prove smoothness of basic games such as (Resource, C Resource ) by mechanizing the standard paper-andpencil proofs (e.g., [8, 2.3 .1] for congestion games).
In our implementation of the a ne routing games of Figure 2 , we model each edge e in the network as a Resource under application of a second combinator, A ine(a e ,b e ,C Resource ), which maps the C Resource cost function to the more general C e (i,s) = if s i is RYes then a e * (tra ic s) + b e else 0. e resulting game over edge e has cost 0 if an agent does not use edge e in state s, and cost a e * (tra ic s) + b e otherwise. 1 e project website includes a second application, to distributed load balancing. 2 We generalize below to multiple-resource games with arbitrary a ne cost functions. 3 We de ne a new inductive type RYes | RNo as opposed to le ing Resource equal the isomorphic bool for technical reasons related to Coq's typeclass resolution.
We generalize from games over a single edge to those over all source-sink paths in a network in two steps:
First, we construct an m-edge game, in which the agents are free to use any subset of the Resources modeling the graph's edges, by building the product of m a ne resources:
. . .
e associated cost function of the game over type T is the sum of the individual A ine(a, b, C Resource ) cost functions.
Second, to transform the unrestricted game over type T -in which players are free to choose any subset of the edges -to one in which the players may choose only valid paths, we apply a nal combinator to T that limits the strategy space to those actions satisfying a predicate, isValidPath(G,s,t ), specifying the set of valid paths from source s to sink t under a particular topology G.
All the combinators we apply in the a ne routing game preserve smoothness. To prove that the game thus implemented by N agents each running MWU converges to an optimal routing con guration, it's therefore su cient to compose our MWU proof with the robust POA guarantee we have proved generically for all smooth games.
Conclusion. is brief announcement reports on the rst formally veri ed implementation of Multiplicative Weights Update, a simple yet powerful algorithm for approximately solving Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE), among many other applications. We prove our MWU implementation correct via a series of program re nements with respect to a high-level implementation of the algorithm. As part of the larger C project, we use our certi ed MWU to prototype a new architecture for veri ed distributed systems in which MWU generically drives game-based distributed systems with robust Price of Anarchy bounds to socially optimal CCEs.
